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Kim:

Essay

Concentrated Ownership and Corporate
Control: Wallenberg Sphere and Samsung
Group
Hwa-Jin Kim*

Abstract
Samsung Group’s success cannot be attributed to its corporate governance structure, at
least thus far. The corporate governance of Samsung has been rather controversial. As the group
faces the succession issue the corporate governance has become as crucial as their new products
and services. Samsung has discovered a role model on the other side of the planet, Wallenberg
Sphere in Sweden. Much effort has been made to learn about Wallenberg’s arrangements and key
to its success. However, a fundamental difference between the institutions in Sweden and Korea
has made the corporate structures of the two groups radically different. Wallenberg uses the dualclass commons whereas Samsung relies upon the circular shareholdings through affiliated firms.
This Essay explains and analyzes the two different institutions and corporate structures, and
argues that the introduction of the dual-class commons in Korea would make the corporate
governance of Samsung more transparent and efficient, if and only if accompanied by Samsung’s
commitment to socially responsible corporate citizenship. This Essay also explains and analyzes
the recent developments in corporate governance of non-banking financial institutions in Korea
and looks into the issue from the perspective of Samsung’s structure in comparison with
Wallenberg’s structure.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Wallenberg Sphere of Sweden and Samsung Group of Korea share
many things in common. Both are the flagship business conglomerates in their
respective countries, significantly contributing to each nation’s GDP. 1 Both of
them exercise substantial influence on the politics and society in their countries

* Professor of Law at Seoul National University, and William W. Cook Global Law
Professor at the University of Michigan Law School.
1

Samsung Group’s some 60 companies, including Samsung Electronics and Samsung Life
Insurance, accounted for 13% of Korea’s GDP in 2011. See Mighty Samsung Weighs Heavy on S
Korea, Financial Times, Nov. 14, 2012. The Wallenbergs owned some 40% of the value of the
listed companies in Sweden by the late 1990s. See The Wallenbergs: Sweden's enduring business
dynasty, The Economist, Oct. 12, 2006.

1
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due to the sheer volume of their production capabilities and number of employees,
suppliers and customers.
From the perspective of corporate governance, they are controlled by the
members of a family through concentrated ownership and other legal and practical
arrangements. 2 For that reason, along with the economic power concentration
concern, Wallenberg used to be, and Samsung has been highly controversial for
many years. And perhaps for that reason again, the two groups of companies and
their people in charge remain close to each other, 3 having developed some sort of
moral alliance and personal friendships. Given that Korea and Sweden historically
were not closely related to each other, it is remarkable that Wallenberg’s name has
become quite recognizable in the Korean industry circle, and Samsung is
responsible for it.
This Essay will explain and briefly analyze the corporate governance
issues in the two groups from the perspective of comparative corporate law,
practice, and finance. As a matter of fact, it is not a secret that Samsung regards
Wallenberg as its model in corporate governance, control, and citizenship. In
particular, Samsung is interested in learning the way Wallenberg managed the
corporate social responsibility issue and family control succession problem. One
of the keys to understanding Wallenberg’s “secret of success” lies in Sweden’s
corporate governance institutions which currently are not available to Samsung as
a Korean corporate group. This Essay will focus on those differences and propose
some institutional and practical changes to Samsung as well as the Korean
government.
II.

THE WALLENBERG MODEL 4

A.

Corporate Structure

2

Concentrated ownership has been the hallmark of Asian and European firms. See Randall
K. Morck ed., Concentrated Corporate Ownership (2000). But, current scholarship shows us that
even in the United States the ownership of large firms is now highly concentrated, not with
families but with institutional investors. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency
Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113
Columbia Law Review 863 (2013); Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the
United States, 22 Review of Financial Studies 1377 (2007).
3

See Powerful Swedish Family Arrives in Korea for Conference, The Dong-A Ilbo, March

18, 2012.
4

For Wallenberg and Swedish economy in general, see Lennart Schön, An Economic
History of Modern Sweden (2012).
2
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The Swedish model of corporate governance gained much attention ever
since the comparative corporate governance scholarship was born in the United
States. 5 Ronald Gilson is well known to be a big fan of the Swedish model.
Gilson designated the Swedish model as an “efficient controlling shareholder
system” 6 , based obviously on the conventional wisdom that the controlling
(minority) shareholder system 7 was not efficient.
The hallmark of the Wallenberg corporate structure is its family control
over the entire group of companies, including such giants as Ericsson, Scania and
ABB, through the dual-class commons owned by Investor, the main company.
Investor, in turn, is owned by the Wallenberg Foundations at 22% in equity and
46% in votes. Gilson even calls the dual-class commons structure as the “Swedish
capital structure.” In the Swedish capital structure “the founders retained stock
with many times the voting power of the class of common stock sold to the
public.” 8 The Wallenberg family has maintained control over the group through
an arrangement that creates huge discrepancy between their cash flow right and
control right. Such a discrepancy typically is characterized as a sign of bad
corporate governance by most scholarly opinions. 9 However, the Wallenberg
structure is an exception and accepted by the Swedish society largely due to
Wallenberg’s social commitments and lack of self-dealing and family members’
entrenchment. The Wallenberg family controls and runs the businesses, but it does
not “own” the franchise. No private benefit of control is known to be enjoyed by
the family.
Corporate Citizenship

B.

Much has been written about Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish version of
Oskar Schindler, who rescued tens of thousands Jews in Nazi-occupied Hungary
5

See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Investment Companies as Guardian
Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in the Corporate Governance Debate, 45 Stanford Law
Review 985 (1993). See also Peter Högfeldt, The History and Politics of Corporate Ownership in
Sweden, in: Randall K. Morck ed., A History of Corporate Governance Around the World: Family
Business Groups to Professional Managers 517 (2005).
6

See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance:
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 Harvard Law Review 1641 (2006).
7

For CMS (Controlling Minority Structure), see Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids,
Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity, in Concentrated Corporate Ownership, supra note __, at
295.
8

See Gilson, supra note 6 at 1660.

9

See, e.g., Stijn Claessens et al., The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian
Corporations, 58 Journal of Financial Economics 81 (2000).
3
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during the later stages of the Second World War. 10 The story fits very well with
the Wallenberg’s image of a conglomerate that has consistently tried to resonate
with the Swedish society as a socially responsible corporate citizen. The
Wallenberg Foundations also extensively support scientific research, higher
education and the arts in Sweden.
The Wallenberg concentrates on such major businesses as Aerospace,
Machinery and Telecommunications, leaving other areas of business to small
enterprises. 11 It also recognizes the labor union as partner, not party on the other
side of the table representing the conflicting interest. This goes back to the triparty Saltsjöbaden Agreement that was signed by Swedish Trade Union
Confederation (Landsorganisationen: LO) and Swedish Employers’ Confederation (Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen: SAF) on December 20, 1938 under the
auspices of the government. Instead of nationalizing business groups’ assets, the
Swedish government and labor unions recognized the business groups’ vested
interests. Through the arrangement, they could keep the big businesses in Swedish
territory, and gain their support for further social reform. Employers, in return, did
agree to take higher corporate tax burden. This industrial relations regime did
survive the far-reaching labor legislation around 1970, and remained effective
until superseded by the Industrial Agreement of 1997, the new labor market
regime in Sweden. 12
THE SAMSUNG ISSUE IN KOREA

III.

Corporate governance in Korea has “again” become a hot political and
social issue. The Korean economy has long been dominated by Chaebols, 13 large
corporate conglomerates, including Samsung Group, throughout its past.
10

See, e.g., Kati Marton, Wallenberg: The Incredible True Story of the Man Who Saved
the Jews of Budapest (2011); Alex Kershaw, The Envoy: The Epic Rescue of the Last Jews of
Europe in the Desperate Closing Months of World War II (2010).
11

In Korea, big business groups expanded into small areas such as bakeries, restaurants
and grocery stores. The problem is that those businesses are regularly run by children or relatives
of controlling-shareholder managers of the business groups. This created outrage in the public
opinion and led to the establishment of the National Commission for Corporate Partnership in
2010 under the Law for Promotion of Coexistence and Partnership between Big and Small and
Medium Size Enterprises.
12

See Nils Elvander, Two Labour Market Regimes in Sweden: A Comparison Between the
Saltsjöbaden Agreement of 1938 and the Industrial Agreement of 1997, 10 Industrielle
Beziehungen 146 (2003).
13

See Jeong Seo, Who Will Control Frankenstein? The Korean Chaebol’s Corporate
Governance, 14 Cardozo Journal of International & Comparative Law 21 (2006); Myung Hun
Kang, The Korean Business Conglomerate: Chaebol Then and Now (1996).
4
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Although corporate governance of Korean firms in general has significantly
improved over time, the concentration of economic and even political powers on
Chaebols have become more intense. 14 Samsung stands in the middle of
controversy. Although Samsung Group is a private business entity comprised of
public and private companies, the public, the media and politicians closely follow
its governance because it has heavy impacts on the markets and the nation’s
economy. 15 Ever since the 2008 global financial crisis, antagonism amongst
general population against Chaebols in general 16 and Samsung in particular has
grown significantly, while some corporate scandals and political campaigns did
contribute to the trend.
Succession Problem

A.

The controlling shareholder-managers of many Chaebols face the
succession problem, with some of them committing questionable acts in the
succession process causing big scandals and ending up standing before law
enforcement agencies and courts. 17
The best way to understand Samsung’s issues is probably looking into its
succession problem. It all starts with Cheil Industries (formerly Samsung
Everland), a theme park housing lots of zoo animals like lions and tigers.
Everland practically functions as the holding company of the Samsung Group. It
controls Samsung Life Insurance, and in turn, the insurance giant controls
Samsung Electronics, the flagship of the group. According to the Financial Times,
as of December 2013 Samsung Electronics was the world’s thirteenth largest
company right after Johnson & Johnson and followed by China Mobile.
Until recently, Cheil remained as a private firm owned largely by
members of the Lee family. 18 Cheil is the Samsung version of Wallenberg’s
14

See Corporate Kingpins Living on Borrowed Time, Korea JoongAng Daily, Dec. 7, 2012
(reporting that a total of 30 largest conglomerates accounted for 95% of GDP in 2011).
15

Cf. Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 Law and Contemporary
Problems 137 (2011) (discussing increased “publicness” and the role of government in corporate
governance of large public companies).
16

See, e.g., Simon Munday, South Korean Companies: Needed on the Home Front,
Financial Times, Nov. 18, 2003.
17

See Hwa-Jin Kim, Seung-Hwan Lee & Stephen Woodcock, Favoritism and Corporate
Law: The Confused Corporate Opportunity Doctrine in the Hyundai Motor Case, 3 Michigan
Journal of Private Equity & Venture Capital Law 41 (2013).
18

The average ownership of the controlling shareholders of non-public member firms of
Samsung Group was 78.43%, whereas their cash-flow rights were as low as 19.43%. For public
member firms the number was 13.52% and 1.14%, respectively. See James Jinho Chang & Hyun5

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2014

5

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 105 [2014]

Investor. So, if control over Cheil gets passed on, the control over the whole group
passes on. The question is to whom. Samsung’s Chairman Lee has three children,
a son and two daughters. They hold controlling shares in Cheil and some shares in
other affiliate companies of the group. In 1996, an important decision was made.
Where Cheil (Everland) offered a substantial amount of convertible bonds to the
shareholders with preemptive rights. Almost all of the shareholders turned down
the offer. Everland then “found” willing buyers from outside, Lee’s children. The
son got the lion’s share and became the new largest shareholder in Everland. It
seemed as if control over the group had been smoothly passed on to the son.
However, the story had a surprising twist.
Five years after the transaction, 43 law professors brought criminal
charges against the Everland managers. They thought that the price of convertible
bonds was too low, resulting in a very cheap transfer of corporate control to the
son to the detriment of the company’s financials. After years of a lengthy and
painful courtroom debacle, the Korean Supreme Court ultimately decided, by a
five to four judgment, that the defendants were not guilty. 19 The Supreme Court’s
judgment made the son’s control over Everland legitimate, but the control and
succession issue has not been solved yet.
The ultimate trouble is that the whole corporate structure of the Samsung
Group has been built on the roundabout circular shareholding. Samsung Life
controls Samsung Electronics, which controls Samsung Card, and Samsung Card
in turn holds a sizable share in Samsung Life. 20 It is now too big an entity for a
family to maintain effective control without such an arrangement. It is almost like
the Lee family controls the entire group through other people’s money. On top of
that, as Chairman Lee gets older, his two ambitious daughters may require their
fair shares in the group. Also, they will have to pay inheritance taxes through
selling the shares. To make the matter more difficult, two financial institutions,
Samsung Life and Samsung Card, are involved in the structure, which invites
political interference and, accordingly, makes the whole issue more difficult to
solve.

Han Shin, Family Ownership and Performance in Korean Conglomerates, 15 Pacific-Basin
Finance Journal 329 (2007).
19

Supreme Court Judgment of May 29, 2009, 2005-No-2371: The entire judgment is
available in Hwa-Jin Kim, Corporate Finance and Governance 462-482 (2nd ed., 2012) (Korean).
20

This structure comes up in the United States, too. See Speiser v. Baker, 525 A.2d 1001
(Del. Ch. 1987). In Germany, they call it “Ringförmige Mehrheitsbeteiligungen.” See Friedrich
Kübler, Gesellschaftsrecht 362 (5th ed. 1998) (suggesting potential liability of directors who
created the structure).
6
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Social Responsibility

B.

From the perspective of stakeholder capitalism, 21 Samsung’s track record
does not look that impressive. The most notable example is Samsung’s decades
long policy against labor unions. Also, its history has been tainted with such
scandals as tax evasions and corrupt practices. 22 Chairman Lee once stepped
down from his office when the former general counsel of the group spoke out
after the former public prosecutor met with some Catholic priests. A special
prosecutor was appointed by the parliament, found some wrongdoings and
indicted Lee. Samsung was forced to pledge for socially responsible management
and committed a significant amount of funds for that purpose. This is the point
where Samsung became eager to learn from Wallenberg’s experiences.
The Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance 23 adopted by the
Korean Committee on Corporate Governance in September 1999 declares that
“[t]he corporation shall not be negligent in its social responsibilities, such as
consumer protection and environmental protection.” 24 Actually, the notion that
corporations are socially responsible was already widespread and well accepted
under the authoritarian military governments from the 1960s through the 1980s.
This notion is also related to the popular concept that socially responsible and
“patriotic” business managers greatly contribute to the economic development of
their “fatherland”.
Socially responsible companies have been popular in Korea along the
way. For instance, pharmaceutical companies act and present themselves almost
like charitable institutions. Big companies build hospitals, museums and schools
21

See generally, Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial
Autonomy and Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 50 Harvard
International Law Journal 129 (2009); Lynn Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth (2012).
22

The family has also been involved in an inheritance dispute. See Court Sides with
Samsung Electronics Chairman in Family Feud, Wall Street Journal, Feb. 1, 2013; Feud Among
Samsung Descendants Heats Up, New York Times, Nov. 14, 2012.
23

Committee on Corporate Governance, Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance
(September 1999).
24

Section IV-1.3. (“With the significant rise of corporation’s influence on the economy
and society, similarly increasing has been the recognition of general public’s concern about
corporation’s social responsibilities. Also, consumers and regional societies have been increasing
in importance as interested parties in the continuance of the corporation. In particular, if the
corporation neglects its social responsibilities, such as protecting consumer rights or the
environment using its vantage, it will, unlike the past, lead to a very adverse effect on its long-term
development as well as to a decline in its image. Therefore, each corporation shall enable its
managers to faithfully perform its social responsibilities through an appropriate governance
system.”)
7
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and establish endowments. 25 Samsung also runs one of the finest hospitals in
Korea. Cheil, together with Samsung Life, has a guide dogs program with many
Labrador Retrievers. Whenever a national disaster occurs, the media
enthusiastically reports on contributions made by the companies with references
to the amounts contributed, sometimes ranked by size. The websites of major
corporations in Korea, including those of Samsung and LG, very proudly
introduce how they value the concept of corporate social responsibility and that
their performance has been in line with such a concept.
On the other hand, there were and are many controlling shareholdermanagers in Korea who voluntarily assume unlimited responsibility for their
companies. They take the financial responsibility of their firms on themselves by
issuing guarantees for the firms’ debt, and by other methods, voluntarily giving up
the benefit of the limited liability principle as they put their personal properties
into the corporation when the firm is in trouble to save the firm and employees’
jobs and even compensate for losses incurred by the firm’s customers. This would
be surprising if it were to happen in a Fortune 500 International public firm. 26
However, most legal scholars in Korea are skeptical about bringing the
concept of corporate social responsibility into a statute. 27 Corporate social
responsibility, however good it may be, may become a simple “guidance” that
does not help judges. It is argued that it is not clear who is the legal beneficiary of
the directors’ obligation to act in a socially responsible way. Also, such a law may
be abused under sensitive and unstable political circumstances. Management
might use the concept to sacrifice shareholder interests. 28 Korean corporate law
as it stands today does not provide the non-shareholder stakeholders of a
corporation with any kind of legal right as far as corporate governance is

25

Like Wallenbergs did, some of the endowments and foundations were used to place part
of a controlling block of shares in friendly hands. Such a practice was also popular because it
could mitigate the inheritance tax burden without diluting control. The Korean government took
some measures to curb the practice in 1997 through a tax law reform.
26

Also, Korean banks usually require the controlling-shareholder managers and other key
officers to issue personal guarantees for a firm’s debts. The Korean banking practice heavily relies
upon secured lending. If the firm fails, the controlling-shareholder manager loses everything,
unless he or she runs some kind of safety funds.
27

See, e.g., Chul Song Lee, Corporate Law 66 -67 (20th ed., 2012) (Korean).

28

In Japan, the House of Representatives resolved twice (in 1973 and 1981) to require the
government to codify the concept, but nothing happened. Id. at 66.
8
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concerned. Non-shareholder stakeholders can only protect their legitimate
interests through contract, tax and labor law. 29
Korea is currently also under the strong influence of the paradigm change
that took place after the global financial crisis and ‘Occupy Wall Street’ campaign.
In the presidential election of 2012, all candidates promised to do something
about the current model of economy. The discussion of corporate social
responsibility has regained the focus in the context of ‘economic democracy.’ As
the biggest business entity in Korea, Samsung is under pressure and should come
up with a new idea and policy that may satisfactorily answer the requirements
newly made by Korean society.
The Case for Dual-Class Commons

C.

The dual-class common stock structure, or the “Swedish capital structure”
as Gilson puts it, is popular in Europe 30 but it is also widely used in the United
States 31 in the big public companies as well as venture capital-backed companies
undergoing IPOs. 32 The most well-known example of the concentrated ownership
with the dual-class structure in the U.S. is Berkshire Hathaway, one of the most
profitable and respected firms in the world. 33 The difference between Berkshire,
Wallenberg and Samsung is that Berkshire is under the control of individual

29

See Section IV-1.2 of the Code: “The corporation shall make every effort to maintain
and improve labor conditions by faithfully observing labor-related statutes such as the Labor
Standard Act.” See also Section IV-2.1 of the Code: “The form and level of management
monitoring by creditors shall be determined through discussion among the related parties,
according to the corporation’s distinctive qualities.” The Korean Act on Worker Participation and
Promotion of Cooperation is basically a labor law statute that enforces convening of labormanagement consultative meetings, during which employers are required to report and explain the
business plans/strategies, matters concerning their implementation, quarterly production plans and
performances, personnel plans, and the corporation’s financial status. So, it cannot be compared
with the German co-determination.
30

Report on the Proportionality Principle in the European Union (18 May 2007).

31

See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of
Shareholder Choice, 76 California Law Review 1 (1988).
32

See, e.g., Laura Field & Jonathan Karpoff, Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms, 57 Journal
of Finance 1857 (2002).
33

By conventional standards, the corporate governance of Berkshire cannot be positively
evaluated. The gap between cash flow right and control right is big. Its aging board does not look
that independent, etc. Perhaps, the firm represents the extremely rare benevolent dictatorship
model that makes all discussions trivial.
9
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managers led by Warren Buffett, 34 not families. The enterprise has neither been
inherited nor faces the bloodline succession problem.
The dual-class structure is regarded as an antitakeover arrangement, 35 but
that is not all that it does. The dual class share system is relatively more
transparent compared to cross-shareholdings or pyramid type structures. 36 If the
dual-class stock system is abolished, the relevant companies will restructure the
corporate governance through adopting cross-shareholding or creating a pyramid
to protect its incumbent manager’s vested interests. 37
One of the reasons that the Korean Chaebols use complicated
shareholding structures is a legal one. The KCC does not allow firms to issue
dual-class common stocks. The one-share-one-vote rule in the KCC 38 has been
regarded as mandatory and, may not be opted out through charter provisions.
Large Korean firms have been growing so rapidly that the controlling
shareholder-managers could not keep up with the speed of their firms’ growths. In
order to avoid the dilution of their shareholding, they built the massive circular
shareholding structures and inter-locking directorships. They control practically
one business entity with very little direct investment. Ironically, the ban on dualclass commons has made the corporate structure of Korean conglomerates less
transparent.

34

See Alice Schroeder, The Snowball: Warren Buffett and the Business of Life (2009).

35

See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 713 (2003); Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO
Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 Journal of Law, Economics,
and Organization 83 (2001); Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and
Governance, 65 Stanford Law Review 1325, 1332 – 1336 (2013) (discussing the staggered board).
36

Hwa-Jin Kim, The Case for Market for Corporate Control in Korea, 8 Journal of
Korean Law 227, 273 (2008).
37

See Lucian Bebchuk & Oliver Hart, A Threat to Dual-Class Shares, Financial Times,
May 31, 2002. But see Ronald Masulis et al., Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies, 64
Journal of Finance (2009) (finding evidence supporting the hypothesis that managers with greater
control rights in excess of cash-flow rights are more likely to pursue private benefits at the
expense of outside shareholders).
38

Article 369, Paragraph 1 of the KCC. For the rule, see generally Sanford Grossman &
Oliver Hart, One Share – One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control, 20 Journal of Financial
Economics 175 (1988); Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate
Control, 94 Journal of Political Economy 461 (1986); Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy,
Encumbered Shares, 2005 University of Illinois Law Review 775. See also Bernard Black &
Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 Harvard Law Review 1911,
1945 - 1946 (1996) (finding that the one share one vote regime has value).
1
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Like it or not, Samsung Group’s future may determine at least the near
future of the Korean economy. Together with Hyundai Motor Company Group,
Samsung is the only Korean business organization that remains competitive in the
ever challenging global markets. If one does not wish Samsung’s failure due to its
corporate governance issues, and given that Samsung itself cannot solve the
problems they have satisfactorily, legislative measures will become inevitable to
the extent that they do not violate the constitution and fundamental principle of
economic justice. Introduction of the dual-class commons into the KCC may well
contribute to the solution under the condition that Samsung follows suit of
Wallenberg in terms of corporate citizenship.
To be sure, it is beyond the scope of this Essay to figure out how
Samsung may use the dual-class commons in its restructuring, if introduced. It
may use methods such as conventional coercive exchange offers 39 and adding
new classes. 40 Numerous factors shall be taken into account in such a
restructuring and unforeseen barriers may also come up with any plan. However,
it is certain that Samsung may enjoy more flexibility benefiting the new legal
environment. Perhaps, the holding structure - as discussed below - with a dualclass regime comparable to Investor in the Wallenberg Sphere may provide
Samsung with a good example.
IV.

INDUSTRY AND FINANCE

The Wallenberg Sphere structured the group into two segments, i.e.,
financial group and non-financial operational group. The two groups are
controlled by Investor, but managed independently. On the finance side, now
almost 160 year old bank Enskilda Banken (SEB) is in charge. The Wallenberg
established Investor for SEB’s holdings some one hundred years ago, when the
law restricted bank ownership of shares in industrial firms.
The Issue

A.

As mentioned above, the typical Korean conglomerate structure,
including that of Samsung, is characterized by cross as well as circular
shareholdings amongst affiliated companies. Many of them are private companies
about which not much information is available to the outside. These firms conduct

39

See, e.g., Richard S. Ruback, Coercive Dual-Class Exchange Offers, 20 Journal of
Financial Economics 153 (1988).
40

See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, New Share Class Gives Google Founders Tighter
Control, DealBook, April 13, 2012.
1
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significant volumes of related party transactions. 41 However, what if the related
party transactions were to take place involving financial institutions?
Ownership in Korean commercial banks is highly dispersed. Major banks
are owned by foreign investors with no controlling interest. Under the Banking
Act, there is a ten percent basic ceiling on bank ownership by a single
shareholder. 42 It is understood that the ceiling was introduced to effectively bar
the Chaebols’, in particular Samsung’s, ownership in commercial banks. The only
issue is that the government exercises a huge influence on the corporate
governance of banks. 43 On the other hand, non-banking financial institutions in
Korea are members of big corporate groups, the Chaebols. The ownership in such
financial institutions, securities firms, insurance companies, and savings banks,
etc., is concentrated. They are under the control of controlling shareholdermanagers or affiliated firms which again are controlled by families or individuals.
The trouble is that the non-banking financial institutions have other important
stakeholders besides managers, employees and shareholders, i.e., customers and
taxpayers. The deposit insurance program also applies to the institutions. Moral
hazard and conflict of interests as exemplified by recent scandals 44 should be
addressed through proper corporate governance arrangements and financial
regulations.
The Korean government and law makers have been struggling with the
issue of ‘separation of industry and finance.’ The core of the discussion is if the
41

See generally Gerard Hertig & Hideki Kanda, Related Party Transactions, in: The
Anatomy of Corporate Law 101 (2004).
42

Article 15, Paragraph 1 of the Banking Act.

43

Hwa-Jin Kim, Taking International Soft Law Seriously: Its Implications for Global
Convergence in Corporate Governance, 1 Journal of Korean Law 1 (2001); Hwa-Jin Kim, Living
with the IMF: A New Approach to Corporate Governance and Regulation of Financial Institutions
in Korea, 17 Berkeley Journal of International Law 61 (1999).
44

The savings banks scandal in 2011 was a reincarnation of the savings and loans scandals
in the United States in 1990s. The controlling shareholder-managers of the troubled savings banks
simply stole money from their banks due to the lack of stringent supervision. Briberies were also
involved in some cases. Reform efforts have largely been unsuccessful due to lobbies to the
lawmakers. But, most savings banks were not members of big corporate groups. Recent scandals
involve member firms of big corporate groups. One such example is Tongyang Group, which
failed in 2013. It turned out that Tongyang Securities sold corporate bonds issued by ailing
affiliates to its customers assuring that the issuers were sound. Many customers were attracted by
an unusually high interest rate, so they were aware of the potential risks, but apparently took the
risk believing in ‘too big to fail.’ See Tongyang Investigation Widens, Korea JoongAng Daily, Oct.
8, 2013. Hyosung Group currently is under criminal investigation, but it appears that they used the
group’s member capital company like a controlling shareholder family’s private cash register. See
Prosecution Has Something to Prove, Korea JoongAng Daily, Oct. 15, 2013.
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law should ban industrial firms’ control over financial firms, i.e., whether Korea
should ban or restrict ownership in non-banking financial institutions by
operational companies in corporate groups which are controlled by families. The
concern here is that industrial firms may abuse financial firms, and their investors
and customers, for the benefit of their shareholders, including the controlling
shareholder and his or her family members. Again, Samsung is in the middle of
the controversy because Samsung Group comprises of financial and non-financial
operational firms under the ultimate control of a family.
Pros and Cons

B.

Opinions favoring the separation are based on mistrust in the financial
supervisory system. As a matter of fact, the savings bank scandal and the recent
failure of some non-banking financial institutions support the validity of the claim
for separation. Ex post regulation cannot be trusted. But, the core of the proseparation arguments is the conflicts of interest. Families in control of the group
and/or operational member firms of the group may harm the financial firm
through tunneling and/or unfairly favoring member firms within the group, its
customers and eventually taxpayers along with systemic risk. Also, a separation
may facilitate fair competition between corporate groups with and without
financial firms.
Opinions against the separation, on the other hand, emphasize that no
country regulates ex ante the new entry into the non-banking industry. Prudential
rules and tight financial supervision will ensure the soundness of the financial
institution. And, as far as economic rational is concerned, a similar argument
favoring the reinstatement of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 applies here, i.e.,
separation blocks the creation of economies of scale and scope and prevents
conglomerates from enjoying the financial synergy with stable cash flow. As a
result it may have adverse impact on the international competitiveness of the local
financial institutions and consumer benefits. 45 The argument also points out that
the Korean banks ended up being owned by foreign investors due to the ban on
ownership of Chaebols in commercial banks. The same thing can happen to the
non-banking financial institutions if more structural regulation is added.
Regarding the possibility that operational firms may abuse financial firms, they
45

For the discussion, see Hwa-Jin Kim, A Global Structural Regulation of Financial
Institutions?, 52-4 Seoul Law Journal 169, 180 - 185 (2011); Charles K. Whitehead, The Volcker
Rule and Evolving Financial Markets, 1 Harvard Business Law Review 39 (2011); Eugene A.
Ludwig, Assessment of Dodd–Frank Financial Regulatory Reform: Strengths, Challenges and
Opportunities for a Stronger Regulatory System, 29 Yale Journal on Regulation 181, 194 (2012);
Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure is an Option: An Ersatz–Antitrust Approach
to Financial Regulation, 120 Yale Law Journal 1368, 1409–1410 (2011).
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emphasize that the reality usually works the other way around. Operational firms
within a group support financial firms through providing business opportunities
arising from the operational firms. 46
The Korean legislature is currently discussing the periodic review on
controlling shareholders’ personal records. If proven that the controlling
shareholder or his/her relatives did commit crime or wrongdoing, the controlling
shareholder shall lose control over the firm through voting right restriction or
administrative order to dispose of the shares in the firm in the stock market.
Besides the question of whether such a drastic measure would survive the
constitutional law challenge, the financial services industry strongly opposes the
legislative move arguing that the corporate governance of non-financial
institutions can be determined by factors that lie beyond the scope of practical
control of controlling shareholders. If adopted, the new rule can in fact be easily
abused by competitors and even unfriendly or hostile family members or relatives.
Furthermore, in a situation where the controlling shareholder is another company,
the corporate governance of certain financial institutions will end up being
changed by acts of another company’s employees.
Holding Structure Solution

C.

The compromising idea in discussion is lifting the ban on general holding
company’s ownership in financial institutions. Under the current Anti-monopoly
and Fair Trade Act, a general holding company may not control financial firms
while financial holding companies are allowed to do it. 47 As an operating
subsidiary cannot control financial subsidiaries in a holding structure the
separation of industry and finance can practically be achieved. In this scenario the
whole Samsung Group transforms itself into a holding structure following the
example of LG Group and SK Group, among others, and can keep Samsung Life
and other nine financial entities within the group.

46

This is actually perceived to be the bigger problem in Korea. Financial member firms
rely too heavily upon businesses supplied by non-financial firms so that their identity and
competitiveness as financial institutions can be compromised. It also has negative impacts on
those firms’ relationship with general consumers. The Korean government has recently issued
guiding rules for related-party transactions involving financial institutions.
47

The law did ban the establishment of a holding company whose primary purpose was to
control the management of a domestic company through equity ownership. The policy was
dropped in 1999 to help big corporate groups ease the restructuring and improvement of corporate
governance. For the regulation of financial holding companies (in the U.S.), see Howell E. Jackson,
The Expanding Obligations of Financial Holding Companies, 107 Harvard Law Review 507
(1994).
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Another idea is the mezzanine (financial) holding company. According to
this, general holding companies shall be allowed to control mezzanine holding
companies that may own financial institutions. Mezzanine holding companies will
become subject to strengthened financial supervision. This scenario offers a less
expensive way for Samsung to deal with the issue because it does not require the
restructuring of the entire group. In any case, the dual-class commons regime as in
the Investor and SEB relationship in the Wallenberg Sphere would be the practical
solution especially because it is likely that the Korean government would allow
the dual-class regime only to private companies, if at all. 48
D.

The Perils of Over-Regulation

It is a very common phenomenon throughout history that politicians and
government officials supported by scholars and other experts try to change or
reform the existing system whenever a scandal takes place. Sometimes it comes
with significant regulatory costs. One of the most recent examples is arguably the
U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 49 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 may
become another example. 50 On the one hand, it is a constructive approach. Things
must be fixed if they are broken. On the other hand, they easily forget that
scandals always involve illegal and criminal acts of those people who are
responsible for damages to investors, shareholders, and the economy. It is true that
Korean firms may take advantage of the financial affilates in bad times. However,
policy should not be formulated on a worst case and/or isolated scenario. It is like
unfairly punishing honest firms for acts committed by the bad guys. It may also
invite opportunistic behavior and corruptive practices in bureaucracy out of the
labyrinth of regulatory and supervisory details that ultimately create further
reform needs.
It has been discussed in the parliament that Samsung Life’s voting rights
in Samsung Electronics should be restricted through amending the Anti-monopoly
and Fair Trade Act. How the idea survives the constitutional law challenge is not
48

See the draft article by the Korean Ministry of Justice’s expert group in Kim, supra note

36 at 274.
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For critical assessments, see Roberta Romano, Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Have a
Future?, 26 Yale Journal on Regulation 229 (2009); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 Yale Law Journal 1521 (2005); William J.
Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of “Going Private,”55 Emory
Law Journal 141 (2006). But, see Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of SarbanesOxley, 105 Michigan Law Review 1817 (2007).
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See, e.g., Diane Katz, Dodd-Frank at Year Three: Onerous and Costly, Heritage Issue
Brief No. 3993, July 19, 2013; Paul Rose & Christopher J. Walker, Dodd-Frank Regulators, CostBenefit Analysis, and Agency Capture, 66 Stanford Law Review Online (2013).
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an issue for politicians. The Constitutional Court of Korea has become the most
active constitutional law court in the world reviewing and overturning
unconstitutional laws passed by the Korean parliament. When Samsung Life in
fact gets separated from the Samsung Group structure, the family control over the
group may become weak. There is no way for the family to maintain effective
control over Samsung Electronics, the world’s thirteenth largest firm, without the
‘assistance’ of Samsung Life. This puts Samsung in the awkward position that it
seems to oppose or resist the government policy. As a result, the whole discussion
on the separation of industry and finance has somehow become a Samsung issue
which is misleading and unfortunate. The lawmakers seem to try to avoid such an
impression, but it is obvious simply because the Samsung issue stands out in any
discussion.
V.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

As Gilson observed, “the presence of family ownership.. facilitates the
development and maintenance of the reputation necessary for a corporation’s
commercial success” in a bad commercial law environment. 51 The best example
is the Wallenberg Sphere in Sweden, a Scandinavian legal system jurisdiction.52
The family business has successfully survived five generations. The same history
of success may repeat in Korea. The first step would be to remove widespread
biases against family-controlled corporate groups with concentrated ownership by
accepting the proposition that they may be efficient as well.
This Essay examined the controversial corporate governance issues of
Samsung Group in comparison with those of the Wallenberg Sphere. The core
difference between the structure and problems arising therefrom is the use of the
dual-class commons in Wallenberg. Korean law does not allow the dual-class
commons, so Samsung relies heavily upon circular shareholding through affiliated
firms. This Essay concludes that the introduction of the dual-class commons in the
KCC would ease the pain in difficult corporate governance problems Samsung
and other Korean firms face should the Wallenberg model be a legitimate one for
the Korean economy and society. This Essay also emphasizes that such a change

51

See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries:
Anchoring Relational Exchange, 60 Stanford Law Review 633, 636 (2007).
52

For discussions on the family-controlled U.S. firms, see Danny Miller et al., Are Family
Firms Really Superior Performers?, 13 Journal of Corporate Finance 829 (2007) (“Although
international evidence suggests that families may be unhelpful to firm performance, recent
analyses of U.S. public companies indicate that family firms outperform.”) See also, Belen
Villalonga & Raphael Amit, How do Family Ownership, Control and Management Affect Firm
Value?, 80 Journal of Financial Economics 385 (2006).
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may be legitimate if and only if Korean firms commit socially responsible
corporate citizenship.
Finally, the policy issue in Korea now is whether stronger regulation on
governance of corporate groups with non-banking financial institutions is in order.
Samsung is in the middle of the controversy. Special legislative initiatives have
also been taken to address the issue. This Essay briefly explained and analyzed
the recent developments in corporate governance of non-banking financial
institutions in Korea and suggested that further regulation would not be efficient
and rather produce bureaucracy and corruptive practices. If Samsung did not
caused the controversy, it is fair to say Samsung may be counted as collateral
damage.
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